Showing posts with label there. Show all posts
Showing posts with label there. Show all posts

Saturday, October 30, 2010

Guest post: is there a bubble on the bond market?

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By John Y Campbell, Adi Sunderam, and Luis M Viceira, first posted at VoxEU

The historically low yields on Treasury bonds are the hallmark of a bubble, according to some commentators. This column analyses the relationship between bond yields, the stock market, and inflation over the past 50 years. It finds that the riskiness of nominal bonds changes over time and that investors and policymakers can use the changing stock-bond correlation as a real-time measure of inflation expectations.

The yields on government bonds are at their lowest levels since the depths of the financial crisis in late 2008. On Monday 18 October, the yield on 10-year Treasury notes hit 2.52%, down from 3.85% at the beginning of the year. This movement is huge by the standards of the Treasury market. An investment in 10-year Treasury notes has returned about 11.4% this year.

Moreover, nominal bonds are exposed to inflation risk. Given that the use of unconventional monetary policy has increased uncertainty about inflation (e.g. Taylor 2009), one might expect investors to regard bonds as particularly risky and demand high yields (low prices). The persistence of historically low yields in the face of such risks has led some commentators, notably Siegel and Schwarz (2010), to suggest there is a bubble in the government bond market.

Bond valuation and risk

What determines how much investors are willing to pay for nominal bonds? There are three critical factors:

* expected inflation,
* real interest rates, and
* risk premia.

Since inflation erodes the real value of the payments bond investors receive, they must adjust prices for expected inflation to earn their target real interest rate. In addition, bonds are risky because realised inflation and interest rates can turn out to be different than investors’ expectations. Risk premia are compensation for bearing this risk.

In recent work, we examine how the riskiness of bonds varies over time (Viceira 2010; Campbell et al. 2009). In particular, we argue that inflation makes bonds risky at certain times, while giving them insurance, or hedge, value at others. For instance, if inflation rises unexpectedly when economic conditions deteriorate, the real value of bond payments falls unexpectedly. In this case, bond investors sustain losses when they likely need funds, and bonds are risky assets that investors should charge a risk premium for holding.

In contrast, if inflation falls unexpectedly when economic conditions deteriorate, bonds are like insurance, providing a windfall at the time investors need it the most. Bond investors should be willing to pay for this insurance value, just as they are willing to pay for other types of insurance. In this case, the inflation risk premium should actually be negative.
Historical evidence

The idea that the riskiness of nominal bonds changes over time is consistent with the evolution of conventional wisdom among investors. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, investors regarded bonds as risky. The famous bear Henry Kaufman, also known as “Dr. Doom”, argued that investors should completely avoid bonds unless they offered high risk premia. In contrast, by the early 2000s investors had come to regard bonds as a safe haven against the risk of a Japan-style episode of deflation.

This conventional wisdom is broadly consistent with the lessons of financial economics. In particular, the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) uses the stock market as a proxy for economic conditions. This suggests a simple metric for the riskiness of an asset: how its returns co-move with stock market returns. Risky assets do poorly at the same time the stock market does poorly, causing investors to sustain losses at the worst possible moment. Such assets should have large risk premia to compensate investors for this risk. In contrast, safe assets do well when the stock market does poorly, adding insurance or hedge value to investor portfolios. These assets require small or even negative risk premia.

Figure 1. Stock and bond returns over time

ViciFig1(1)

Figure 1 plots the co-movement of stock and bond returns over time. The intuitions of the CAPM are broadly consistent with the way investors have historically viewed bonds. In the late 1970s and 1980s, stock and bond returns co-moved positively. When stocks did poorly bonds also did poorly, consistent with the idea that they were risky. By the 2000s, stock and bond returns co-moved negatively, suggesting that bonds had become safe havens.

Figure 2. Bond returns and inflation over time

ViciFig2

Figure 2 shows that the behaviour of bond returns is related to the behaviour of inflation by plotting the historical co-movement of stock returns and inflation. Since inflation is bad for bond returns we invert the graph. The pattern is very similar to the co-movement of bond returns and stock returns: positive in the 1970s and 1980s and negative in the 2000s.

Thus, it appears that the changing risks of nominal bonds are related to the changing relationship between inflation and economic growth. When inflation is procyclical, as it was in the 1960s and 2000s, inflation falls at the same time that unemployment is rising and growth is falling. During these periods, stocks and nominal bonds are negatively correlated and nominal bonds hedge deflation risk. In contrast, when inflation is countercyclical, as it was in the 1970s and 1980s, inflation rises as unemployment rises and growth falls. In an environment of stagflation, stocks and nominal bonds are positively correlated and nominal bonds are risky.

Implications for the current environment

What can this model for bond prices tell us about the world today? Figure 3 shows the co-movement of stock and bond returns, our measure of riskiness, over the last five years. The series turned sharply negative once the financial crisis began in mid-2007, briefly returned towards zero by mid-2009, and has again been quite negative over the past year.

Figure 3. Stock and bond returns and riskiness over time

ViciFig3(1)

The stock-bond correlation implies that investors currently view government bonds as a hedge against the possibility of deflation and low growth. Though they may be uncertain about the direction of inflation over the next five years, investors appear to believe that any increase in inflation will likely be accompanied by growth, making it less painful for their portfolios.

In evaluating the current level of bond prices, the critical question is whether investors are correct. If inflation will indeed be accompanied by growth, then nominal bonds should carry a negative inflation risk premium and correspondingly high prices. However, it is also possible that the economy could enter a period of stagflation with high inflation and low growth. In this case, investors should be charging a higher inflation risk premium, and bond prices should be lower today.

Our work also has important implications for policymakers trying to use financial data to understand inflation expectations. First, policymakers can use the stock-bond correlation as a “canary in the coalmine.” If the correlation starts to turn positive, policymakers will know that investor anxiety about stagflation is rising. They can then take steps to keep inflation expectations well-anchored.

Second, policymakers often use break-even inflation, the difference between the yields on nominal and inflation-indexed bonds (TIPS), as a proxy for market inflation expectations. However, this quantity is actually the sum of expected inflation and the inflation risk premium. Thus, if the inflation risk premium is negative, breakeven inflation understates market inflation expectations. The negative correlation between stocks and bonds today suggests that the inflation risk premium on Treasuries is negative, and it could be as low as -75 or -85 basis points. This implies that investor expectations of 10-year inflation reflected in the bond market are around 2.7%, in line with the view of professional forecasters and the inflation swap market.

Conclusions

Financial market data suggest that investors expect inflation to be moderate and procyclical going forward. However, the behaviour of inflation has changed in the past and may do so again. Investors and policymakers alike can use the stock-bond correlation as a real-time measure of inflation expectations.

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Wednesday, October 27, 2010

Many Bank claims that there is nothing inconsistent with Foreclosures: 4450 Foreclosures judgment in NYC due to inaccuracies

After the dramatic States foreclosure stops by three large repairers, GMAC, Bank of America and JP Morgan, on the use of bad, "signed robot" affidavits, the new line of banks and other party who also used robo signatories as Wells Fargo, is that it was a simple "technical" problem, that they had reviewed ten thousands of pending of seizures and pointed out that the information and the underlying processes were healthy.

A review by the New York Daily News suggests otherwise.Note that New York is a State judicial locking. make sure you read the sentence that I FAT:

A Daily News probe found thousands of foreclosures across the city are involved because the paperwork used to justify the seizure of houses is riddled with flaws.

Banks have suspended some 4,450 seizures in all boroughs of five due to problems of administrative formalities as missing and incorrect documents, signatures suspicious and banks try to foreclose on mortgages, they own… even

Last week, judge to top the New York Jonathan Lippman, began requiring all counsel for the Bank to sign a referee for the accuracy of their materials from foreclosure.

Which could be a problem for locking of the long island which has been translated by GMAC mortgages last year.

An affidavit dated date 30 March was signed by a person identified as Sherry Hall, vice President of a GMAC always called Financial Network affiliate.

Fifteen days later another statement under oath is surface in another lock in Suffolk County, this time, signed by a GMAC Vice-President appointed Sheri d. Hall.

Despite the difference in names, signatures are the same - and supported by the notary.

Supreme Court Suffolk Peter Mayer has refused to approve foreclosing the name Sherry Hall and ordered his and the notary to appear in court, 17 novembre.GMAC officials do not call return

Judges also see banks excluding homes that they have not yet - a problem which concerns Brooklyn Court Supreme Arthur Schack.

Schack said that it had become increasingly "disorder" trying to determine who holds a mortgage at the time of foreclosure, because they are often passed a lender to another….

Last August, Schack rejected a lock that Bank of New York brought on e. 48th Street home in Brooklyn filed 61 days before the mortgage was assigned to the Bank.

Judge has dubbed as "absurd" proved a computer printout which claims to the Bank held the mortgage before the foreclosure has been introduced.

In may, Schack rejected request a lawyer that the assignment of the mortgage on a House Bushwick HSBC Jefferson St. was valid.

"Counsel seems to work in a parallel universe mortgage, unrelated to the real world", he said.

He even shot a lock on a drive Staten home in Brooklyn because JPMorgan Chase could not prove he holds the mortgage up to 75 days after the procedure began….

Last year, Schack threw a foreclosure involving a woman who claimed to be much.

On a lock, she swore that she was an assistant vice President for a Bank as well as a civil servant for lenders, une.Dans another clearing house, she was a Vice President Assistant for yet another institution.

"It is a Milliner because of the number of hats, her pleasure", famous said the judge.

Some banks also pursue seizures, even after that offenders owners sold homes and pay the mortgage.

Schack told the press that it expects to see more paperwork mouthing. ""It's like an onion, we continue to peel," he said. ""It seems to be layers and problems.

Do an extrapolation simple.Ville New York has a population of approximately 8.4 millions.Il was lowest in the nation (thus more units per capita) household size, but also a very low level of ownership in the nation in its ensemble.Nous assume that nets.

The United States population is roughly 308 millions.Si problems with seizures to the United States rate is the same, as in New York, suggest that 163,000 seizures are ongoing documentation problems, and that some of them indicated in article (excluding those who are acquitted of the mortgage, the lack of clear property note) are not simple "paperwork" problems, but the point more serious.

Also note that at least some judges are not convinced by breezy insurance banks all is now well.

Don't forget that this rapid calculation applied to seizures now in cours.Le cumulative number is clearly very much greater.

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Wednesday, October 20, 2010

Investor Alert: there are just borrowers who are suffering in hands agent

By MBSGuy, an expert of securitization

In the comments to my post yesterday, "So Why mortgage services use"Robo signatories"?", drive Justica pointed out another element of misconduct mechanic, namely, investor lack of confidence in the reports, and therefore the disbursements that repairers are their donner.De "investors complain more handed over Flawed" to Alert Asset-Backed:

Mortgage bond buyers lose the faith of the accuracy of delivery reports and some say that arrest could soon be factor in their investment strategies.

Reporting Awards, distributed on a monthly basis by the Trustees of securitisation, purport to provide snapshots of routine activities cash-collection and distribution of repairers. However, investors say there has been a rash of recent cases in which reported data differ considerably from what is actually the past — making it impossible to determine the values of their assets.

[...]

Why were reliable reports once wrong? point investors in part to the increase in use this year loan mortgage modification programs that government agencies and lenders have developed in order to help troubled borrowers. They argue that some colleges are unable to verify the change to take effect, resulting in discrepancies between when a loan given actual cash flows change and when these adjustments are reported.

Repairers argue that recent changes volume became huge at their levels of dotation.Ils also faced continual find treat loans currently in phases of testing programs modification.Un professional maintenance "It makes it almost impossible for us to adequately take account of change," said struggles.

Buysiders call this a red herring, saying repairers are equipped to take account of the changes as they occur. ""Repairers simply don't pay enough attention to what is happening in the underlying loans," said a source.

On one level, this article looks like another mechanic lame excuse is not to mortgage mods."See, this is SOO hard, we can even account for it properly."

The real causes not much to see the difficulty of the task and all to do with the direction.

One of the reasons why they do not have all these complicated things people is because they fired all experienced people and keep staff less chère.Comme market is slightly improved, any person with powers left places a low value, leaving behind the workers lower (there was lots of turnover over 9 months).

In some ways, large patterns are convinced that this is not their fault.

By passing over the years, I attended several cases of repairers or trustees screwing much less complicated in the reports of the investor, sometimes to the detriment of certain holders of liaison.Qui situations is almost certainly pass maintenant.Si adjustments changes are not be properly recorded, it probably means that too much money is distributed to the junior bond holders, who should write destroy, to the detriment of high consequence obligataires.En, which was due to higher bond interest is paid to the junior holders, and since there are only a finite cash amount, senior bond holders will eventually with less money they have.

In addition, it is highly unlikely that colleges do are not properly accounting for the costs of foreclosure huge they are now enter attaquées.Si seizures it costs in some cases, more to defend the foreclosure as the balance of the loan (not to mention the recoverable product obtained from the sale of the House), these costs should not be borne by the engineer fiducie.Le shall be reimbursed only for the cost of locking, as well as all interest accrued from the proceeds of the sale of engineer forclusion.Le should also stop progress interest for the loan of offender if the interest and fees can more be restored.

I suspect that it is impossible to determine if this is actually done right in the reports of engineer.

A final area of improper accounting which would be important for investors is reimbursement of advances of senior engineer and interests advances on défaillants.Ce borrowers are reimbursed only from forclusion.Mais considering what a drain represent progress recipes (maintenance now is a negative cash flow), it is not difficult to imagine that services use also produces refunds in main non-forclusion (sales and refis) to repay their progress, when these principal payments must go to investors.

An action on behalf of the investor confidence and sellers should probably also include requests for maladministration and maintenance trust against the engineer and the trustee.

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